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THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE:




On the afternoon of April 27, 1983, off the Virginia coast, Marine
First Lieutenant David A. Boyle and three crew members flew a
CH-53D assault helicopter on a practice approach to the USS
Shreveport. Lieutenant Boyle, the copilot, sat in the left seat.' The
pilot in command sat to Boyle's right, and the two other crew mem-
bers occupied the rear. Boyle's helicopter was the second of a two-
ship flight.2 As the two aircraft approached the Shreveport, the
lead helicopter began slowing down too soon. To avoid collision,
Boyle's crew decided to take the aircraft around for a second ap-
proach. 3 The pilot in command took the controls and attempted to
execute the necessary maneuvers, but the helicopter was too close
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Law School; Fulbright Scholar.
** Associate with Gendery and Sprague. B.A., North Texas State; J.D., St. Mary's Univer-
sity. The authors would like to express their gratitude to D. Todd Smith, former Editor-in-
Chief of the St. Mary's University Law Journal, Briefing Attorney to the Honorable Raul A.
Gonzalez, Supreme Court of Texas, and currently an Associate of the Fulbright Jaworski law
firm in Dallas, for the excellent editing talent that he employed in the extensive rewriting of
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1 See Colin P. Cahoon, Boyle Under Siege, 59 J. AiR L. & COM. 815, 819, 823-25 (1994)
(discussing the factual background to the Boyle decision); see also Boyle v. United Techs.
Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 502 (recounting facts leading to the death of First Lieutenant Boyle), on
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to the water for a successful turn.4 As a result, the aircraft crashed
into the water right side down.5 Although the other three crew
members successfully exited the sinking helicopter, Boyle was un-
able to open the emergency exit due to the severe pressure from the
water.6 His body was later recovered with the aircraft.7
When Boyle's father sued the helicopter manufacturer, the case
made history. In a 1988 decision, Boyle v. United Technologies
Corp.,8 the United States Supreme Court barred the claim and af-
firmed the "[g]overnment contractor defense," now also known as
the "Boyle defense." 9 In Boyle, the Court concluded that govern-
mental contractors are immune from tort liability under certain cir-
cumstances. 10 Since then, the government contractor defense has
grown in strength, shielding those successfully invoking it from li-
ability for injuries caused by defective products they manufactured.
Through Boyle and its progeny, the bench has placed obstacles in a
plaintiffs path to recovery which become more stringent with each
decision.
The purpose of this Article is to discuss the weaknesses of the
Boyle defense and to show how, by using skillful discovery tactics,
plaintiffs may defeat the defense in order to successfully recover for
their injuries. Part I outlines the history of the government con-
tractor defense." Part II describes the evolution of the defense un-
der Boyle. 12 Part III reviews the three independent elements set
4 See id.
5 See id. at 824.
6 See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 503.
7 See Cahoon, supra note 1, at 825 n.40.
8 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
9 See id. at 513 (referring to helicopter manufacturer's defense as the "[g]overnment con-
tractor defense"); see also Cahoon, supra note 1, at 816 (commenting on the "Boyle defense").
10 See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 505-06 (noting the immunity given to contractors from tort li-
ability when they contract with the government). In Boyle, the Supreme Court listed the
elements which a contractor must prove in order to successfully invoke the contractor de-
fense. These elements are: (1) reasonably precise specifications approved by the United
States government; (2) conformation to those specifications; and (3) a warning to the gov-
ernment by the contractor regarding the dangers presented by use of the equipment which
were known to the contractor but were not known to the United States government. See id.
at 512. Although not specifically enumerated in the list of elements to the Boyle defense, it is
evident that, as a preliminary matter, the United States shall be immune from liability. See
Michael Overly, Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.: The Turning Point for the Government
Contractor Defense?, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 935, 961-62 (1988) (providing that sovereign im-
munity is the underlying prong to the government contractor defense and it "is not waived
unless the action is authorized under the FTCA").
11 See infra notes 15-66 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 67-105 and accompanying text.
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forth in Boyle, and the ways by which a plaintiff may overcome each
element. 13 Finally, Part IV discusses whether the collateral source
rule presents an additional barrier to a plaintiffs recovery in a suit
against a government contractor.14
I. ORIGINS OF THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
A. Agency Principles
The government contractor defense originated in a series of pub-
lic work cases.15 In these decisions, courts applied principles of
agency to cloak the contractor with the government's sovereign im-
munity 6 when the contractor had complied strictly with govern-
13 See infra notes 106-88 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 189-210 and accompanying text.
15 See, e.g., Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 20-21 (1940) (holding, in a
case involving the building of dikes in the Missouri River, that if a contractor's "authority to
carry out the project was validly conferred,... there is no liability on the part of the contrac-
tor for executing [the government's] will"); Paquete Habana, 189 U.S. 453, 465 (1903)
(illustrating that where the contractor is carrying out an act "authorized or ... adopted by
the" government, the contractor will be protected from liability); Lamar v. Browne, 92 U.S.
187, 199-200 (1875) (finding government agent was shielded from liability because it was
acting within the scope of government instructions); Myers v. United States, 323 F.2d 580,
583 (9th Cir. 1963) (holding contractor immune from liability because construction of high-
way allegedly resulting in injury complied with federal government specifications); Dolphin
Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824, 827 (D. Conn. 1965) (holding that govern-
ment contractor was not liable to plaintiff for damages allegedly caused by fumes from spoil
dredged from river channel); see also Richard Ausness, Surrogate Immunity: The Govern-
ment Contract Defense and Products Liability, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 985, 993-95 (1986)
(chronicling development of the government contractor defense in area of public works
cases). Ausness provides an enlightening discussion of the rationale behind the development
of the contractor defense in these public works cases. The rationale includes the reasoning
utilized by the court in Yearsley that the contractor partakes in the immunity of the govern-
ment because he acts as an agent of the government, as well as the rationale espoused in
Dolphin Gardens, namely that the government contractor defense is necessary for the gov-
ernment to be able to carry out its objectives. See id.; see also George E. Hurley, Jr., Gov-
ernment Contractor Liability in Military Design Defect Cases: The Need for Judicial Inter-
vention, 117 MIL. L. REv. 219, 226 (1987) (citing Yearsley as a case from which the
government contractor defense originated). Commander Hurley points out that while the
Yearsley Court based its decision on agency, a relationship which has been infrequently
found in contracts between the government and military manufacturers, Yearsley and its
progeny have laid the precedent for many types of suits against government contractors. See
id. at 227; see also Overly, supra note 10, at 936 (providing that originally, the defense was
used only in cases involving public works projects).
16 The doctrine of sovereign immunity is based on the notion that the "king can do no
wrong .... [and it] precludes a litigant from asserting an otherwise meritorious cause of ac-
tion against a sovereign or a party with sovereign attributes unless the sovereign consents to
the suit." Principe Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Board of Comm'rs, 333 F. Supp. 353, 355 (E.D.
La. 1971). "As a general rule, the United States Government, as 'sovereign,' is liable to third
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ment-provided specifications. 17 Over time, courts have expanded
this early version of the government contractor defense, applying it
to products liability actions based on theories of negligence, strict
liability, and breach of warranty.'8
A seminal case illustrating this early version of the government
contractor defense is the 1940 United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Construction Co. 19 In that case, a
contractor, under the direction and authority of the government,
was hired to improve navigation on the Missouri River.20 The gov-
ernment required the contractor to build several dikes along the
river.21 During the construction of the dikes, ninety-five acres of
the plaintiffs land were flooded. 22  The plaintiff brought suit
against the contractor for damages to his land.23
parties only when the government expressly waives its sovereign immunity." Dawson v.
Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 712 F.2d 264, 267 (7th Cir. 1983).
17 See, e.g., Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 20-21 (holding that wherein contractor strictly complies,
there is no liability to contractor for executing government's will); Paquete Habana, 189 U.S.
at 465 (illustrating that where contractor acts with strict compliance, contractor will be pro-
tected from liability); Lamar, 92 U.S. at 199 (shielding the contractor from liability because
the contractor was acting in strict compliance with government's instructions); Myers, 323
F.2d at 583 (holding no liability for contractor who strictly adhered to government's instruc-
tions); Dolphin Gardens, 243 F. Supp. at 827 (using Yearsley as a basis for holding that
where government contractor took no part in government's decision regarding disposal of
spoil dredged from river channel and contractor was not obligated under government con-
tract to take precautions against escape of fumes, contractor was not liable to plaintiff for
damages allegedly caused by fumes); see also Ausness, supra note 15, at 993 (explaining that
under the government contractor defense, the work must be done "in accordance with
[government] plans and specifications"); Hurley, supra note 15, at 226 (noting that in Years-
ley, a case from which the government contractor defense evolved, a contractor was not held
liable because his work was done in conformity with a government contract); Overly, supra
note 10, at 939-41 (discussing the underlying agency argument in the development of the
government contractor defense in public works cases).
18 See Overly, supra note 10, at 936 (providing that although the government contractor
defense began in public works cases, it grew to be used as a shield against liability in a num-
ber of circumstances).
19 309 U.S. 18 (1940).
20 See id. at 19; see also Overly, supra note 10, at 939-40 (stating that Yearsley best illus-
trates the early government contractor defense which was based on agency theory and was
invoked in public works cases).
21 See Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 19 (presenting the government's instructions to the contractor
that he build dikes in order to create artificial erosion, thereby improving navigability of the
Missouri River).
22 See id. at 20 (restating the basis for the plaintiffs claim of damages).
23 See id. at 19-20 (claiming the contractor's acts resulted in the flooding and erosion of 95
acres of plaintiffs land); see also Overly, supra note 10, at 940 (reporting the facts of the
Yearsley case wherein contractor's construction of dams according to government specifica-
tions caused an erosion of plaintiff riparian land owner's property).
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Recognizing the government contractor defense for the first time,
the Supreme Court held that the action of the contractor-agent is
the "act of the government."24 In addition, the Court determined
that "there is no ground for holding [a governmental] agent liable
[when he] is simply acting under [government authority]." 25 There-
fore, under Yearsley, a contractor who follows the government's
guidelines may avoid liability arising from the contractor's per-
formance. 26
24 Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 22 (quoting United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 465 (1903)
where, in reference to agency relationship between contractor and government, the Court
said "[tihe action of the agent is 'the act of the government"'); see Overly, supra note 10, at
940 (discussing the Yearsley Court's agency rationale which implied that the government
contractor should share in the government's sovereign immunity).
25 Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 22 (extending sovereign immunity to pubic works contractor who
was acting as agent of the government); see Overly, supra note 10, at 940 (quoting the Su-
preme Court's language in Yearsley that "'there is no ground for holding [the government's]
agent liable [when he] is simply acting under" validly conferred authority (alteration in
original)); Neil G. Wolf, Note, Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.: A Reasonably Precise Im-
munity-Specifying the Defense Contractor's Shield, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 825, 837-39 (1990)
(exploring the historical importance of the Yearsley decision in the development of a contrac-
tor's defense).
26 See Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 21 (noting that an agent acting on behalf of the government is
accountable for his injury-causing actions only if the agent has exceeded his authority, or if
authority was invalidly conferred). In Yearsley, the plaintiff alleged that as a result of defen-
dant contractor's dredging, the Missouri River shifted course so as to cause erosion of the ri-
parian property owner's land. See id. at 19-20. The Yearsley Court held that the "plain and
adequate remedy" provided for a taking of private land for public use is the payment of just
compensation for the land from the government. Id. at 21-22. The Court further stated that
there was no ground for holding liable the contractor, who was merely carrying out valid
government action. See id. at 22. A significant number of cases followed Yearsley in likewise
denying liability to a contractor who followed government guidelines. See, e.g., Tozer v. LTV
Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 405 (4th Cir. 1986) (refusing liability of government contractor on negli-
gence and strict liability grounds); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, 755 F.2d 352, 354-55 (3d Cir.
1985) (finding no liability for government contractor on theory of agency); McKay v. Rockwell
Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 450-51 (9th Cir. 1983) (construing the defense broadly, and there-
fore concluding that unless a government contractor exceeds his authority, there is no liabil-
ity); Myers v. United States, 323 F.2d 580, 583 (9th Cir. 1963) (providing that in as much as
work performed by contractor in construction of federal highway conformed with terms of
contract with United States, no liability could be imposed on contractor for damages
claimed); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1054 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)
("Courts should not require suppliers of ordnance to question the military's needs or specifi-
cations for weapons during wartime .... [safety issues] are not sources of liability which
should be thrust upon a supplier, nor are they decisions that are properly made by a court.").
Still other courts have failed to extend the government contractor defense to shield defen-
dant contractors from liability. See, e.g., Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736,
739-40 (11th Cir. 1985) (declining to consider the defendant's Yearsley defense since the
agency/sovereign immunity theory was not presented fully in the trial court); Bynum v. FMC
Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 564 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that if "contractors ... fail to follow govern-
ment specifications or otherwise mismanufacture a product [they] are not entitled to raise
the [government contractor] defense"); Merritt, Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson
Co., 295 F.2d 14, 16 (9th Cir. 1961) (reasoning that where contract left construction and
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This agency version of the government contractor defense has
proved difficult to apply because the defendant contractor must
show that an agency relationship existed between it and the gov-
ernment.27 Manufacturers who contract with the military are not
hired as employees; rather, the basis of the relationship is contrac-
tual.28 Thus, for many military contractors, this defense is ill-
suited.29 Further, changes in military contracting procedures and
the military procurement process have limited the applicability of
this defense to a non-military contractor context.30
B. The Contract Specification Defense
A second historical means of shielding government contractors
from liability is traditionally referred to as the "contract specifica-
maintenance of cofferdam to discretion of contractors and where none of contractor's negli-
gent acts were required by government, contractor would not be protected from liability for
damages resulting from faulty cofferdam construction).
27 An agency relationship arises when one party, the principal, authorizes another party
known as the agent to serve as the principal's representative and to act for the principal in
furthering the principal's interests. See ROBERT T. KIMBROUGH, SUMMARY OF AMERICAN LAW
§ 1:1 (1974); see also Bynum, 770 F.2d at 564 (noting, in public works cases, the requirement
of an underlying agency relationship between the contractor and the government which al-
lows the government contractor defense to be successfully invoked); Ausness, supra note 15,
at 994 (presenting the agency relationship between the government and the contractor as
one rationale behind the government contractor defense); Overly, supra note 10, at 940
(stating that the government contractor defense, as applied in Yearsley, requires the defen-
dant to prove an agency relationship between the government and the contractor). Ausness
points out that there is no consensus among courts or legal commentators regarding the pol-
icy behind the defense. See Ausness, supra note 15, at 1014-32. In addition to the agency
theory, there is the theory that protection of contractors is integral to carrying out the Feres
doctrine, as well as the broader concepts of sovereign immunity and separation of powers.
See discussion infra notes 40-66 and accompanying text; see also Overly, supra note 10, at
943-48; Wolf, supra note 25, at 839 (recognizing the limited usefulness of the "original gov-
ernment contract defense" due to the requirement of an agency relationship between the con-
tractor and government).
28 See Mark Keith Sales, Comment, Government Contractor Defense: Sharing the Protec-
tive Cloak of Sovereign Immunity After McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 37 BAYLOR L. REv.
181, 222 n.316 (1985) (distinguishing further between agent/principal relationships and mere
buyer/seller relationships and noting that in the military procurement process, many con-
tractors have only a buyer/seller or independent contractor relationship with the govern-
ment).
29 See Bynum, 770 F.2d at 564 (discussing the agency requirement of the government con-
tractor defense as set forth in Yearsley); Overly, supra note 10, at 940 (indicating that the
Yearsley government contractor defense is difficult for military contractors to successfully
use in avoiding liability because of the agency requirement); Wolf, supra note 25, at 839
(noting that as "the original government contract defense" was dependent upon the existence
of an agency relationship between the contractor and government, the "defense proved to be
only marginally useful").
30 See Overly, supra note 10, at 940-41.
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tion defense."81 This defense is not limited to contractors who are
hired by the government.3 2 The contract specification defense is af-
forded to both private and government contractors when they follow
the directions and specifications of a third party, usually the em-
ployer.33 When a contractor is hired to manufacture or perform un-
der very specific orders, the contract specification defense protects
him from liability for any defect in the product.3 4 Instead of appor-
tioning liability to the contractor, the employer ordering a specific
product design assumes responsibility for any consequence of an
unsafe product.3 5
As the contract specification defense is grounded on the theory of
reasonable reliance, the contractor is not protected by the defense if
he follows specifications that contain obviously dangerous defects
that would cause a reasonable person not to follow them.36 Courts
31 See Ryan v. Feeney & Sheehan Bldg. Co., 145 N.E. 321, 321-22 (N.Y. 1924) (noting that
a contractor is justified in relying upon specifications which he has contracted to follow un-
less those specifications are apparently defective such that a reasonable and prudent con-
tractor would be on notice that to build according to the specifications would be dangerous
and likely to cause injury); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 404 cmt. a (1965)
(noting how the contract specification defense is utilized); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS 681 (4th ed. 1971) (discussing "[o]ne important limitation" to liability
for negligent design and construction whereby "the contractor is not liable if he has merely
carried out carefully the plans, specifications and directions given him, since in that case the
responsibility is assumed by the employer"). The reason behind the contract specification
defense has traditionally been that contractors do not have the special knowledge necessary
to evaluate the appropriateness of government specifications. See Johnston v. United States,
568 F. Supp. 351, 354 (D. Kan. 1983) (noting that "ordinary negligence principles" form the
basis of this defense, as does the "presumption that a contractor will lack the expertise to
evaluate the specifications given him"). However, if the contractor does in fact possess
knowledge about the specific design or specification, then he may be held liable. See id.
(recognizing that where the manufacturer has special knowledge, he may be held to the
same, or even a higher standard of care, as the designer of the product).
32 See Overly, supra note 10, at 941 ("Unlike the Yearsley agency defense, the contract
specification defense applies to both private and government contractors.").
33 See Ryan, 145 N.E. at 321-22 (discussing the availability of the contract specification
defense to a builder relying upon specifications from which he had neither notice of impend-
ing danger, nor notice of the likelihood of injury).
34 See id. (illustrating the protection from liability afforded by the contract specification
defense).
35 See PROSSER, supra note 31, at 681 (noting that the employer undertakes liability when
a contractor simply follows the employer's specifications).
36 The contract specification defense is based upon negligence principles. See Ryan, 145
N.E. at 321-22 (holding that a builder is not liable for any defects when relying on plans and
specifications which he contracted to follow, unless the defects are so apparent that an ordi-
nary builder would know of the likelihood of injury); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 404
cmt. a (1965) (discussing the "competent contractor" standard whereby a contractor avoids
liability for an unsafe product "unless it is so obviously bad" that a contractor would readily
realize the potential for injury); Wolf, supra note 25, at 840 (noting that, absent special
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have determined that an average contractor cannot be expected to
possess the expertise needed to examine every design it is given.37
Therefore, when reasonable, a contractor may rely on a third-
party's design specifications without fear of liability.8 This reason-
ableness requirement, however, is irrelevant to cases not sounding
in negligence. 39 Consequently, the contract specification theory,
like the defense based on agency principles, is limited in its applica-
tion.
C. The Feres-Stencel Doctrine
Both versions of the government contractor defense discussed
above were limited in scope when applied to a military contractor
situation.40 As stated earlier, the military contractor's relationship
with the government does not create an agency relationship; and in
addition, most defective product actions are alleged under strict
products liability which renders the contract specification defense
useless.41 As years passed and products liability litigation against
knowledge, "the average contractor is not expected to possess the requisite knowledge or ex-
pertise to evaluate the government's contract specifications").
37 See Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 354 (D. Kan. 1983) (stating that the
contractor is not required to sit in judgment on the plans and specifications provided by his
employer, since he "will lack the expertise to evaluate the specifications given him-just as a
nurse or orderly will seldom be in a position to second guess a physician").
38 See Burgess v. Colorado Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844, 846-47 (11th Cir. 1985) (allowing the
manufacturer to raise the contract specification defense when it manufactured an animal
vaccine in accordance with government specifications); Johnston, 568 F. Supp. at 354 (finding
"[tihe contract specification defense applies to products manufactured to the order and speci-
fication of another, whether that other be the government or a private party" and therefore a
contractor will not be held liable for following the plans and specifications of his employer);
Davis v. Henderlong Lumber Co., 221 F. Supp. 129, 134 (N.D. Ind. 1963) (stating that when
any danger in the plans or specifications is not obvious, it is reasonable for the contractor to
adhere to the plans or specifications given to him by his employer).
39 See Overly, supra note 10, at 943 (noting the difficulty that military contractors have in
invoking the contract specification defense because most litigation involving military equip-
ment is grounded in strict products liability); R. Todd Johnson, Comment, In Defense of the
Government Contractor Defense, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 219, 228 (1986) (discussing the unavail-
ability of the contract specification defense in strict liability suits against government con-
tractors).
40 See Wolf, supra note 25, at 837-39 (discussing the difficulty for contractors who attempt
to prove an agency relationship between the contractor and the government-employer);
Johnson, supra note 39, at 228 (noting the limiting aspects of the early versions of the gov-
ernment contractor defense).
41 See Overly, supra note 10, at 943 (noting that the contract specification defense is of no
avail where an action sounds in strict products liability, the primary form of military product
actions); Johnson, supra note 39, at 228 (examining a contractor's difficulty in invoking the
contract specification defense in strict liability actions).
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military contractors increased, courts formulated the Feres-Stencel
doctrine, which did not protect the government contractor in every
situation.42 This doctrine emerged from two United States Su-
preme Court cases,43 Feres v. United States" and Stencel Aero En-
gineering Corp. v. United States. 45
In Feres, the Supreme Court determined that the "[g]overnment
is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to serv-
icemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activ-
ity incident to service."4 The Court reasoned that the relationship
between the government and members of the armed forces has a
very distinctive character that requires unique protection.47 Spe-
cifically, the Court determined that if suits were allowed against
the military for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed,
the special relationship of a soldier to his superiors would be
harmed.48
42 The Feres-Stencel doctrine provided the government with immunity from a direct suit
by a member of the military for injuries related to government service, or an action for in-
demnity by a contractor to recover for damages paid. See Overly, supra note 10, at 947. The
doctrine presented a particularly difficult obstacle for contractors, in that they were required
to adhere to government specifications, yet would be held liable for any resulting injuries,
with no opportunity at redress. See id. This, combined with the ineffectiveness of the tradi-
tional defenses of agency and contract specification gave way to the judicially created gov-
ernment contractor defense. See id. at 947-48.
43 See id. at 944 (stating that the Feres-Stencel doctrine emerged from two United States
Supreme Court cases).
44 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
45 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
46 Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
47 See id. at 143 ("The relationship between the Government and members of its armed
forces is 'distinctively federal in character.'").
48 See id. at 145-46 (providing a discussion of the reasoning for military actions being gov-
erned by federal law and noting that "the few cases charging superior officers or the govern-
ment with neglect or misconduct ... since the Tort Claims Act ... have either been suits by
widows or surviving dependents, or have been brought after the individual was discharged");
see also United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954) (discussing the "special relation-
ship of the soldier to his superiors" and the potentially extreme effects of allowing suits un-
der the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)). United States v. Johnson provides another look at
the importance of the relationship of the government to those in service. See United States
v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987). In Johnson, Lieutenant Commander Johnson, a Coast
Guard helicopter pilot, was dispatched to search for a vessel that was in distress. See id. at
683. Commander Johnson's helicopter entered inclement weather and Johnson requested
radar assistance from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). See id. The FAA con-
trollers assumed positive radar control over the helicopter, and shortly thereafter, the heli-
copter crashed. See id. Commander Johnson's family brought suit against the federal gov-
ernment under the FTCA. See id. Justice Powell, writing for a 5-4 majority, held that the
Feres doctrine did not bar suit. See id. at 682-85. The circuit court made the following
statement regarding this case:
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Because the Feres decision barred members of the service from
bringing suit against the military, servicemen injured by military
equipment began bringing suit against manufacturers of the alleg-
edly defective products.49 In response, the manufacturers argued
that they had little control over the design specifications that
caused the injury.50 This argument proved futile, however, and con-
tractors were forced to pay for injuries resulting from their imple-
mentation of government specifications. 51
In Stencel, Captain John Donham was seriously injured when his
fighter aircraft malfunctioned during a midair emergency. 52 Don-
ham sued both Stencel, the manufacturer of the aircraft's ejection
system, and the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA).53 Stencel cross-claimed against the government, seeking
indemnity for any damages that Stencel might have to pay.5 4 The
district court granted summary judgment for the government find-
ing that Donham's injuries were within the scope of his military
service, and consequently Donham could not recover under the
The complaint in this case alleges that plaintiffs decedent was killed because civilian
FAA air traffic controllers negligently guided the helicopter he was piloting into a
mountain. There is absolutely no hint in the scant record before this court that the con-
duct of any alleged tortfeasor even remotely connected to the military will be scrutinized
if this case proceeds to trial.... Since the prosecution of plaintiffs claim cannot con-
ceivably involve or compromise a military relationship or, for that matter, the military
disciplinary structure, the prosecution of plaintiffs claim will not encroach upon the ra-
tionale which "serves largely if not exclusively as the predicate for the Feres doctrine."
Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530, 1539 (11th Cir.), vacated, 760 F.2d 244 (11th Cir.
1985), reinstated, 779 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 681 (1987).
49 See W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 131 (5th ed. 1984)
(noting the effects of the Feres doctrine on lawsuits sounding in tort, specifically injuries re-
lated to the manufacture of military equipment).
50 See Stencel, 431 U.S. at 668 (discussing defendant manufacturer's argument that it had
very little control over the product, in that the government had required the design of an
ejection seat which was defective and eventually caused the plaintiffs injuries); Tillett v. J.I.
Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 599 (7th Cir. 1985) (presenting manufacturer's argument that it had
no authority to change the specifications set forth by the government); Sanner v. Ford Motor
Co., 364 A.2d 43, 45-46 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976), affd, 381 A.2d 805 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1977), cert. denied, 384 A.2d 846 (N.J. 1978) (stating that the contractor was enti-
tled to immunity because government specifications required jeeps to be built without seat
belts).
51 See Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673-74.
52 See id. at 667-68 (setting out the facts underlying the suit brought by Captain Don-
ham).
53 See id. at 668 (discussing plaintiffs suit under the FTCA); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2674
(1994) ("The United States shall be liable.., relating to tort claims, in the same manner and
to the same extent as a private individual" except for pre-judgment interest and punitive
damages).
54 See Stencel, 431 U.S. at 668.
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FTCA.55 The Supreme Court also granted the government's motion
for summary judgment against Stencel, thereby disallowing Stencel
to indirectly recover what Donham could not recover. 6 In so hold-
ing, the Court broadened governmental immunity and barred con-
tractors from seeking indemnity from the military when the con-
tractor was forced to pay for injuries sustained by a serviceman.57
Thus, the Feres-Stencel doctrine was born.
Johnson v. United States58 illustrates how the Feres doctrine has
been broadly applied to bar a plaintiffs claim against the military.
In Johnson, Sergeant Jimmy Ray Johnson was hospitalized for a
mental illness, the doctor concluding that Johnson suffered from
"severe psychosis accompanied by homicidal and suicidal tenden-
cies."59 Johnson was released from the hospital and then re-
admitted after he assaulted his wife. 60 Again released from the
hospital, Johnson requested leave, which was denied by his cap-
tain.61  Johnson's executive officer overruled the captain and
granted Johnson's request.62 On leave, Johnson "killed his brother-
in-law, Carroll Johns, shot his wife and then killed himself."63
As a result of these events, the widow of Carroll Johns filed a
wrongful death action against the United States under the FTCA.64
Although the Feres doctrine exception to the FTCA only applies to
injuries that "'are in the course of activity incident to service,"' the
court barred the plaintiffs claim, notwithstanding that Johnson
was on leave when the incident occurred. 65 The court reasoned that
"medical care given servicemen in army hospitals is so entwined
with the military relationship that a serviceman cannot bring an
action under the FTCA."66 Although the reasoning seemed some-
what illogical, the Feres doctrine prevailed again.
55 See id. at 668-69.
56 See id. at 673 (presenting the Court's rationale for disallowing recovery for the contrac-
tor when military personnel would not be allowed to recover).
57 See id. at 673-74 (illustrating how the Supreme Court broadened the notion of govern-
mental immunity in disallowing recovery to Stencel).
58 631 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1980).




63 Id. (presenting the facts which led up to the Johnson suit).
64 See id.
65 Id. (quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950)).
66 Id. at 36.
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Under the Feres-Stencel doctrine, the military had a virtually in-
destructible shield that forced the government contractor to adhere
to government specifications without any protection for injuries re-
sulting from those specifications. As a result, the government con-
tractor had no choice but to utilize the outdated, ill-suited defenses
of agency and contract specification.
II. THE MODERN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
A. Extension to Manufacturers
In the 1982 decision of In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability
Litigation,67 the Eastern District of New York formulated the test
for determining whether a government contractor could be held li-
able for injuries caused by a defective product.68 Agent Orange in-
volved a series of claims by injured veterans against various chemi-
cal companies that produced a defoliant herbicide for the military's
use in the Vietnam conflict. After analyzing the public policy issues
behind the Feres-Stencel doctrine, the court concluded that govern-
ment contractors should not bear total responsibility for the gov-
ernment's specifications. 69 Consequently, the court held that gov-
ernment contractors should be protected from liability based on an
extension of governmental immunity.7 0 The Agent Orange court es-
tablished a three-prong test in which the defendant must show
that: (1) the government wrote the specifications for the product; (2)
the product conforms to the government specifications in every ma-
terial respect; and (3) the government knows as much as or more
than the defendant about the hazards of the product.71
67 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
68 See id. at 1055 (discussing the court's test).
69 See id. (stressing that government contractors should not have to bear all of the liabil-
ity which might result from a harm-producing product manufactured according to the gov-
ernment's specifications).
70 See id. at 1055-56 (concluding that since injustice results when government contractors
bear all liability resulting from a harm-producing product manufactured according to the
government's specifications, the contractor should be able to receive protection from liability
by sharing in the government's immunity).
71 See id. at 1055 (establishing the three-prong test in order to determine whether a con-
tractor should be able to invoke immunity from liability). The Agent Orange test was estab-
lished during a second trial set to hear argument on the standards applicable to the govern-
ment contractor defense, as well as the specific facts needed to prove the defense. See id. at
1055 (setting forth the applicable standard); see also In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.,
506 F. Supp. 762, 798-99 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (requiring the service and filing of briefs regarding
standards and proof, and noting that the court would entertain arguments on these issues).
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Most federal courts adopted, or adapted,. the Agent Orange test
and applied it to cases involving design defects in military equip-
ment.72 Like many federal common law rules, however, the gov-
ernment contractor defense was not applied uniformly.73 For ex-
ample, in McKay v. Rockwell International,74 the widows of two
Navy pilots brought a products liability action against the manufac-
turer of an aircraft that malfunctioned during a routine flight. In
McKay, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
adopted a very lenient form of the Agent Orange government con-
tractor defense. 75 The court allowed the manufacturer to avoid li-
ability where the manufacturer chose the defective design, and the
The first prong of the test is the establishment prong. See Agent Orange, 534 F.Supp. at
1056. It avoids the imposition of liability on a contractor who only supplied the government
with a product which the government requested. See id. The second prong is known as the
"[p]roduct [meets] the [g]overnment's [s]pecifications" prong. Id. at 1057. This prong re-
quires that there not be a material discrepancy between the product produced and that
which was requested according to specifications. See id. The third prong of the Agent Or-
ange test is the "[kinowledge" prong. Id. It requires that the contractor warn the govern-
ment of all known risks associated with the product in order to allow the government an op-
portunity to weigh the risk with the need for the product. See id.; see also A.L. Haizlip, The
Government Contractor Defense in Tort Liability: A Continuing Genesis, 19 PUB. CONT. L.J.
116, 125 (1989) (listing the three-prong test established in Agent Orange).
72 See Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 746-47 (11th Cir. 1985) (denying
immunity from liability, under a test slightly different from Agent Orange, to contractor who
exclusively designed a defective airplane stabilizer system); Schoenborn v. Boeing Co., 769
F.2d 115, 121, 125 (3d Cir. 1985) (adopting the Agent Orange test and finding under the third
prong that a contractor would not be held liable for a defect of which the government had
knowledge, but nevertheless approved); Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 741 F.2d 656, 661-
62 (3d Cir. 1984) (remanding for new trial in accordance with a slightly adapted government
contractor defense); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 450-51 (9th Cir. 1983)
(remanding for determination of the facts under a modified government contractor defense);
Bynum v. General Motors Corp., 599 F. Supp. 155, 158 (N.D. Miss. 1984), affd, 770 F.2d 556
(5th Cir. 1985) (denying recovery to a plaintiff who was injured in an Army cargo carrier ac-
cident because the parties to the litigation had stipulated to all three elements of the gov-
ernment contractor defense as set forth in Agent Orange); Hubbs v. United Techs., 574 F.
Supp. 96, 98 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (applying the three-prong government contractor defense in a
case involving alleged defective design of a Navy helicopter); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol,
553 F. Supp. 340, 343-44 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (finding that the contractor failed to prove the third
element of the Agent Orange test).
73 The Ninth Circuit test closely mirrors the Agent Orange test. See McKay, 704 F.2d at
451 (adopting the Agent Orange three-prong test with a slight modification-the manufac-
turer need only show that the government established or approved "reasonably precise speci-
fications" for the product). The Fifth Circuit adopted the McKay test. See Bynum v. FMC
Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 567 (5th Cir. 1985) (adopting the McKay test at least as it applied to
that specific case).
74 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983).
75 See Haizlip, supra note 71, at 128 (discussing the leniency of the test set out by the
McKay court). Haizlip emphasized that although the test was more lenient than that used in
Agent Orange, the McKay standard is limited in use to cases involving military equipment.
See id.
Albany Law Review
government merely approved that design.76 Modifying the Agent
Orange test, the McKay court held that a plaintiff may not recover
against a defendant manufacturer if the manufacturer shows that:
(1) the federal government was immune from suit under the FTCA;
(2) the government established or approved reasonably precise de-
sign specifications; (3) the product conformed to these specifica-
tions; and (4) the manufacturer warned the government about dan-
gers involving the product that were known to the manufacturer
but not to the government. 77 Thus, although the government had
no hand in designing the specifications of the product, the manufac-
turer could avoid liability for its defects in the Ninth Circuit. Fur-
ther, the reasonably precise design specifications element of the
McKay test made it easier for government contractors to avoid li-
ability than under the stricter Agent Orange test.78 Instead of
proving that the government drafted a very specific design that was
followed in every material aspect, the manufacturer simply had to
show that "reasonably precise specifications" were either estab-
lished or merely approved by the government.7 9
B. Results of the Boyle Litigation
After Lieutenant Boyle drowned as a result of the malfunctioning
of his emergency exit, Boyle's father filed a diversity action against
the Sikorsky Division of United Technologies Corporation, the heli-
copter manufacturer, claiming negligence and breach of warranty in
the design of the co-pilot's escape hatch.80  Specifically, Boyle
claimed that when one of the control sticks was pulled fully up-
ward, it interfered with the co-pilot's access to the control of his es-
76 See McKay, 704 F.2d at 451 (insulating manufacturer from liability stemming from the
defective design of military equipment which the contractor selected and which the govern-
ment merely approved).
77 See id. (setting forth the elements of the McKay test).
78 See Jules F. Miller, Liability and Relief of Government Contractors for Injuries to Serv-
ice Members, 104 MIL. L. REV. 1, 16-21 (1984) (noting the impact of the McKay court's ruling
on liability actions directed at government contractors); June E. Wagner, Note, Tate v. Boe-
ing Helicopters: Government Contractors Increasingly at Risk Despite the Government Con-
tractor Defense, 23 N. KY. L. REV. 377, 406 (1996) (discussing the effect of McKay on the
Boyle decision).
79 See Haizlip, supra note 71, at 128 (noting the leniency of the McKay standard for con-
tractors seeking to invoke the government contractor defense).
80 See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 792 F.2d 413, 413-14 (4th Cir. 1986) (discussing the
facts which allegedly led to the death of Boyle and resulted in the lawsuit by Boyle's father),
vacated, 487 U.S. 500, on remand, 857 F.2d 1468 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 994 (1988),
reh'g denied, 489 U.S. 1047 (1989).
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cape hatch.8' The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for
$725,000.82 United Technologies appealed to the Fourth Circuit,
arguing immunity under the government contractor defense.83
Applying the lenient McKay test, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that the military contractor defense precluded any recovery by
Boyle for the design defect.8 4 First, the court concluded that the
FTCA did not waive the Navy's governmental immunity.8 5 Next,
the court noted that the Navy and United Technologies worked to-
gether to design specifications for the helicopter.8 6 This team-work
approach, the court concluded, established governmental approval
of the design in question.8 7 Because the Navy accepted the manu-
factured helicopter, the court determined that the product fully
complied with the specifications.88 Finally, the court concluded that
there was no evidence that United Technologies knew of any haz-
ards of which the Navy was not aware.89 Thus, each of the ele-
ments of the military contractor defense had been met, and the jury
verdict against United Technologies was reversed. 90
Boyle's father sought review by the United States Supreme
Court, and in January, 1987, the Court granted certiorari. 91 Boyle
argued that, absent federal legislation specifically immunizing gov-
ernment contractors, federal law cannot interfere with state tort
law and shield contractors from liability and defective designs.92 In
81 See id. at 414 (recounting alleged defect in the positioning of a control stick which
blocked access to the co-pilot escape hatch).
82 See id. (noting the jury's general verdict).
83 See id. (stating that the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, based upon
the military contractor defense, was brought by the Sikorsky Division of United Technologies
Corporation and was denied by the district judge).
84 See id. (outlining the conditions under which a military contractor avoids liability).
85 See id.; see also Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 408 (4th Cir. 1986) (reasoning that
allowing military personnel to recover from military contractors would defeat the purpose of
governmental immunity by adding the costs associated with the contractors' liability to the
price of the contract).
86 See Boyle, 792 F.2d at 414 (discussing the steps the court went through in applying the
McKay four-prong test to the Boyle facts).
87 See id.
88 See id. at 415 ("[Tlhe Navy accepted it as fully complying with specifications.").
89 See id. (noting that the Navy had accepted the helicopter 13 years before Boyle's acci-
dent, thus making it unlikely that the contractor knew of any hazards unknown to the
Navy).
90 See id. at 414-15 (discussing application of the McKay test which resulted in reversal of
jury verdict for plaintiff).
91 479 U.S. 1029 (1987) (granting certiorari).
92 See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (presenting plaintiff Boyle's argu-
ment regarding choice of law), on remand, 857 F.2d 1468 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 994
(1988), reh'g denied, 489 U.S. 1047 (1989).
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an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court stated that liability of inde-
pendent contractors performing work for the federal government is
an area of uniquely federal concern. 93 State law holding govern-
ment contractors liable for design defects in military equipment
may present a significant conflict with federal policy, thus requiring
displacement of state law by the courts' so called "federal common
law."94
The Court determined that
Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be
imposed, pursuant to state law, when (1) the United States
approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equip-
ment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier
warned the United States about the dangers in the use of
the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to
the United States.95
Although the Supreme Court adopted the McKay elements, it re-
jected the Fourth Circuit's justification for the government contrac-
tor defense. 96 McKay barred suits against manufacturers on the
basis that such suits would frustrate the policy reasons behind the
Feres-Stencel doctrine.97 However, in Boyle, the Supreme Court
concluded that a justification based on the Feres-Stencel doctrine
would produce inconsistent results, being too narrow in some in-
stances, and too broad in others.98 For example, Justice Scalia
noted that if the government contractor defense was successfully
asserted every time the government enjoyed sovereign immunity,
93 See id. at 512 (labeling the relationship between independent contractors and the gov-
ernment a uniquely federal concern, thereby requiring federal law to trump state law in ad-
judication of tort claims against contractors performing work for the government).
94 Id. at 504, 512.
95 Id. at 512.
96 Compare id. at 509-12 (reasoning that the protection of discretionary decision-making
for the federal government is the correct justification), with McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp.,
704 F.2d 444, 450-51 (9th Cir. 1983) (reasoning that frustration of the Feres-Stencel doctrine
should be avoided).
97 See McKay, 704 F.2d at 450-51 (discussing the policy basis for the Feres-Stencel doc-
trine).
98 See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510 (refusing to adopt the analysis of the McKay court). Justice
Scalia, commenting on the Court's decision not to adopt the McKay analysis, stated that the
application of the Feres doctrine would be too broad in that the doctrine would prevent suit
against a manufacturer in every instance where there could be no suit against the Govern-
ment. See id. Conversely, application of the Feres doctrine would produce results in another
respect too narrow in that the doctrine bars liability only for service-related injuries, not in-
juries caused by the military to civilians. See id. at 5 10-11.
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claims resulting from manufacturing defects would be barred.99
When manufacturing defects cannot be linked to government ap-
proval of specifications, applying the government contractor defense
to such manufactural defect claims would distort the purpose of the
defense.100
Abandoning the Feres-Stencel doctrine as the supporting ration-
ale for the government contractor defense, the Boyle Court based its
decision to recognize the defense on the discretionary function of
the government.101 The Court noted the need for independence in
the executive branch in order to make decisions regarding the mili-
tary. 10 2 Indeed, the Court observed that the armed forces must be
able to select appropriate designs for military equipment without
interference from the courts. 0 As one commentator has explained:
There is a significant federal interest in the ability of the
military to exercise its discretion in the creation of such
standards, given the unique expertise and information
available to that sector of the executive branch, and to allow
intrusive judicial review and liability to result from such de-
cisions could only have a chilling effect on military processes
that would, in the long run, be detrimental to the best inter-
ests of national defense and security. 10 4
Although critics claim that the barriers Boyle has erected against
plaintiffs seeking to recover from government contractors are too
harsh, advocates explain that the Boyle defense "is a necessary con-
99 See id. at 510 (discussing how justification of the military contractor defense using the
Feres-Stencel doctrine would be too broad).
100 See id. (presenting the Court's reasoning for not adopting the McKay justification for
the military contractor defense).
101 See id. at 511 (justifying the military contractor defense). The Boyle Court illustrated
the appropriateness of recognizing the government contractor defense by stating that the
selection of the design for military equipment is certainly a discretionary function of the fed-
eral government. See id. The Court reasoned that to allow second-guessing of the govern-
ment's discretion by way of state tort suits against government contractors would be to per-
mit what the FTCA sought to avoid. See id. (discussing the balancing of military, technical
and social considerations in which the government engages when determining specifications
for military equipment, and the deleterious effect of tort actions against government contrac-
tors on the government's discretion in setting specifications).
102 See id. at 511 (stressing the unique balancing which the government must be free to
conduct in designing military equipment).
103 See id. (denouncing state tort actions against government contractors as interfering
with the government's discretion in designing military equipment).
104 Wayne Lindsey Robbins, Jr., Comment, The Government Contract Defense After Boyle
v. United Technologies Corporation, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 291, 302-03 (1989).
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sequence of the incompatibility of modern products liability law and
the exigencies of national defense." 05
III. BREAKING DOWN THE BARRIERS-ONE ELEMENT AT A TIME
A. Government Approval of Reasonably Precise Specifications
The first element of the Boyle defense requires that the govern-
ment approve reasonably precise specifications for the equipment's
design. 10 6 Although a multitude of arguments exist as to the defini-
tion of "reasonably precise," the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have held
that the approval element is satisfied when the government con-
tractor can show that the government required the manufacturer to
"strictly adhere to previously established, Government-approved
specifications" 07 and that "[n]o deviations to the specifications or
drawings were permitted without Government approval."108 In
other words, a government employee's mere rubber stamp or accep-
tance of the contractor's working drawings does not establish the
first element of the Boyle defense. 10 9 Instead, the contractor must
show that a team-like effort existed in all communications between
the contractor and the government, with the government providing
general specifications and approval at various stages of project de-
velopment." 0
105 Harduvel v. General Dynamics Corp., 878 F.2d 1311, 1322 (11th Cir. 1989).
106 See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512 (setting forth the elements of the Boyle government contrac-
tor defense); Cahoon, supra note 1, at 835 (discussing the "reasonably precise specifications"
element that a government contractor must prove in order to avoid liability under the gov-
ernment contractor defense).
107 Cahoon, supra note 1, at 836 (quoting from affidavit testimony provided by the defen-
dant in Skyline Air Serv., Inc. v. G. L. Capps Co., 916 F.2d 977, 978 (5th Cir. 1990)).
108 Id.
109 See Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1479-80 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting
that the first element of the Boyle defense requires more than a mere showing that the gov-
ernment agreed in a cursory fashion to designs or specifications).
110 See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 792 F.2d 413, 414 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting the impor-
tance of the level of involvement between the contractor and the government), vacated, 487
U.S. 500, on remand, 857 F.2d 1468 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 994 (1988), reh'g denied,
489 U.S. 1047 (1989); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, 755 F.2d 352, 355 (3rd Cir. 1985)
(emphasizing that the first prong of the Boyle defense hinges on the degree to which the gov-
ernment controlled the design of the product); Cahoon, supra note 1, at 835-36 (discussing
that the first prong of the Boyle test requires a contractor to prove a significant level of in-
volvement between the government and the contractor); Haizlip, supra note 71, at 139
(noting "that the greater the contractor's involvement, the less its chance for immunity"). In
his discussion of what constitutes "reasonably precise specifications," Haizlip notes different
scenarios under which a contractor might experience varying levels of governmental in-
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Therefore, the plaintiffs best line of attack against the Boyle de-
fense is to allege that the government did not exercise its discretion
over design features."' Often a contractor will purchase an item off
the shelf, that a private manufacturer designed and produced in
advance. 112 Under these circumstances, the government has nei-
ther used discretion in the design nor approved the design of the
product, and consequently the contractor would not be protected. 113
Additionally, the defendant contractor may be open to liability if
the government leaves critical design features to the manufac-
turer's discretion and approves only the end product. 14 Leaving the
"means to the end" in the manufacturer's hands will usually pene-
trate the first element of the Boyle defense." 5
volvement. See id. at 138-39 (citing Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 740
(11th Cir. 1985)). Haizlip points out that at times, a very rigorous set of plans and specifica-
tions might govern a product's manufacture; in other situations, several sets of specifications
might be conflicting, and in still other situations, plans and specifications might be formu-
lated by more than one source. See id.
111 See MYRON P. PAPADAKIS, UNDERSTANDING THE MILITARY CONTRACT DEFENSE-WHAT
THE JUSTICE MEANT TO SAY 10 (June 3, 1995) (Aviation Law Section Meeting, State Bar of
Texas) (suggesting that a plaintiff can best hope to defeat the Boyle defense by claiming that
the government was not significantly involved in the design of the harm-producing product);
see also Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512 (stating that liability can be imposed if the government did not
give approval through consideration of the design feature in question).
112 See PAPADAKIS, supra note 111, at 10 (observing that a plaintiff can successfully claim
lack of government involvement in a product's design when the product was purchased off
the shelf).
113 See id. (offering that when the government purchases a product off the shelf, the gov-
ernment's lack of involvement in product design indicates that the contractor would not be
free of liability); see also David E. Seidelson, From Feres v. United States to Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp.: An Examination of Supreme Court Jurisprudence and a Couple of Sug-
gestions, 32 DuQ. L. REV. 219, 261-62 (1994) ("If the injury-producing defect were attribut-
able to the contractor and not to the government, there would be no impropriety in permit-
ting the victim to recover from the contractor, even though the victim could not recover and
the contractor could not secure indemnification from the government."). But see McKay v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 453 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that the contractor defense
can be invoked even when the contractor was the sole source of the design if the government
approved "final reasonably detailed specifications").
114 See Seidelson, supra note 113, at 266-67 (stating that the requirements in Boyle
"would limit the defense to those actions in which the defect was attributable primarily to
government fault, and preclude the defense where the defect was primarily attributable to
contractor fault").
115 See PAPADAKIS, supra note 111, at 10 (suggesting that when a manufacturer has the
final discretion regarding the construction of a product, the manufacturer likely will be un-
able to invoke the government contractor defense); see also Seidelson, supra note 113, at 260-
67 (observing that a manufacturer who is unable to show a relatively close working relation-
ship with the government in manufacturing a product will not meet the first element of the
government contractor defense). Although it appears that a manufacturer will be unable to
invoke the government contractor defense when that contractor is left with a great degree of
discretion in designing and manufacturing a product, it bears pointing out that at least one
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Another method by which the plaintiff may satisfy the first prong
of the Boyle defense is to allege that the government's specifications
are not reasonably precise, but instead, are general and vague. 116
This allegation, however, usually leads to a massive paper war
during the discovery phase of the case, with the contractor produc-
ing the design specifications, the blueprints of the product, and any
government design guidelines that were incorporated into the speci-
fications. Because the Boyle decision provided little guidance in de-
fining what is "reasonably precise," courts have struggled to for-
mulate a consistent approach to evaluating whether such evidence
meets this requirement. 117
case has held that even when the contractor designs a product with no input from the gov-
ernment, that contractor, nonetheless, can invoke the defense. See McKay, 704 F.2d at 453
(illustrating liberal application of the government contractor defense to facts wherein con-
tractor was the sole source of product design if the government approved the "final reasona-
bly detailed specifications").
116 See Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 745 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting
that specifications for product manufacture may come from several different sources, and
they may differ in detail, specificity, and range). The Shaw decision set forth an alternative
government contractor defense. See id. The 11th Circuit in Shaw held that a contractor
would not be liable for injuries if the contractor "affirmatively proves" that "it did not partici-
pate, or participated only minimally, in the design of" defective equipment and that "it timely
warned" the government of risks and provided "alternative designs reasonably known by the
contractor, and that" the contractor received authorization from the government "to proceed
with the dangerous design" despite such warning. Id. at 746. Additionally, the Shaw court
cautioned against placing too much emphasis on "reasonably precise specifications," stating:
"Specifications may be minimal or detailed, quantitative or qualitative, general or specific;
they may range from meticulous descriptions of each bearing and bushing required, to vague
hopes for 'simple' or 'failsafe' products. At times, several sets of specifications, sometimes
conflicting, may govern a product's design all at once .... " Id. at 745; see also Haizlip, supra
note 71, at 138-39 (providing an enlightening discussion of what "reasonably precise specifi-
cations" means). Although the government contractor defense as set forth in Boyle might
appear to be easy to apply, Haizlip points out that several unresolved issues remain in the
Boyle aftermath. See id. Among the post-Boyle questions are what will suffice as
"reasonably precise specifications." Other unanswered questions include: (1) whether the
government contractor defense applies to all government contractors; (2) whether it prohibits
suit by "all victims, military and nonmilitary"; (3) whether the government should be granted
immunity before the defense can be used; (4) what constitutes "sufficient warning"; (5)
whether the discretionary function makes the defense "breathtakingly sweeping"; and (6)
whether the government contractor defense exceeds the bounds of public policy. Id. at 116.
117 See Haizlip, supra note 71, at 138-39 (stating that since the meaning of "reasonably
precise specifications" remains unanswered after the Boyle decision, courts will continually
have to struggle when applying the government contractor defense to a given set of facts). In
discussing the problem of interpreting what the Boyle Court meant by "reasonably precise
specifications," Haizlip states that, "[u]nless Congress offers both specific guidance and a
precise definition, the courts of the future will be forced to seek guidance from other courts
that have addressed these issues on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 139.
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Two Fifth Circuit cases, Smith v. Xerox Corp.118 and Trevino v.
General Dynamics Corp.,119 illustrate this struggle. In Smith, an
Army soldier was injured when an explosive cartridge in a shoul-
der-mounted weapon simulator discharged prematurely. 120 In the
soldier's lawsuit against Xerox, the simulator's manufacturer, the
court determined that the defendant failed to produce complete
specifications for the product in question. 121 However, Xerox did
produce a listing of those specifications, a copy of the original gov-
ernment performance criteria, and a production contract specifi-
cally referring to government-approved specifications. 122 Recog-
nizing a distinction between "reasonably precise" specifications and
"precise" ones, the Fifth Circuit found that Xerox had met the first
element of the government contractor defense. 23 By construing the
"reasonably precise specifications" standard broadly, the Smith
court allowed Xerox to meet the first element of the Boyle defense
merely by providing the overall specifications for the product.
In Trevino, decided the same day as Smith,124 the Fifth Circuit at-
tempted to define the amount of government discretion needed to
meet Boyle's "reasonably precise specification" element. 125 In Tre-
vino, five Navy divers died aboard the USS Grayback when a ven-
tilation valve allowing oxygen into the submarine's diving chamber
malfunctioned, causing a vacuum to form in the chamber. 126 Al-
though a diver lock-in/lock-out system had been installed thirteen
years prior to the accident, the ship had served since that time
without an accident.' 27 The contract in question required General
Dynamics to assume full responsibility for all necessary technical
118 866 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1989).
119 865 F.2d 1474 (5th Cir. 1989).
120 See Smith, 866 F.2d at 136 (recounting incident leading to soldier's injury and result-
ing litigation).
121 See id. at 138.
122 See id. (detailing evidence which manufacturer produced regarding the degree of speci-
ficity in the government's specifications followed in the design and manufacture of the simu-
lator).
123 Id. (illustrating the Smith court's broad interpretation of the first element of the gov-
ernment contractor defense set forth by the Boyle Court).
124 See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
125 See Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1479-80 (5th Cir. 1989)
(attempting to set a standard below which there is insufficient governmental approval to af-
ford a contractor the ability to invoke the government contractor defense, distinguishing be-
tween the government's exercise of discretion over the design and scenarios in which the
government delegates its discretion).
126 See id. at 1476 (providing facts which led to the deaths of five Navy divers).
127 See id. at 1477 (discussing the Grayback's historical safety rating).
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research and to assure quality control before issuing the product to
the Navy. 128 Additionally, each blueprint or drawing "was signed by
a government employee in a box marked 'approved. 1" 29 Upon com-
pletion of all the redesign drawings, General Dynamics' employees
departed the work site, leaving the Navy to perform all of the
manufacturing and redesign work on the submarine. 30
The plaintiffs in Trevino argued that, regardless of how precise
General Dynamics' specifications were, the government had failed
to approve those specifications. 13 1 Applying the Boyle defense, the
district court held that, although each drawing contained a gov-
ernment employee's signature indicating approval of the design,
such a minimum level of review was insufficient to constitute ap-
proval. 13 2 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's
decision, concluding that "approval" under the Boyle defense re-
quires more than a "rubber stamp" of the design features. 3 3 The
Trevino court further stated that the basis for the Boyle defense is
to protect the discretionary function of the government, which in-
volves the use of policy judgment. 3 4 As the court stated:
The government exercises its discretion over the design when it
actually chooses a design feature. The government delegates
the design discretion when it buys a product designed by a pri-
vate manufacturer; when it contracts for the design of a product
or a feature of a product, leaving the critical design decisions to
the private contractor; or when it contracts out the design of a
concept generated by the government, requiring only that the
128 See id. at 1476-77.
129 Id. at 1477 (establishing the balance of control between the Navy, as agent for the gov-
ernment, and General Dynamics in the design and manufacture of a Navy submarine).
130 See id. (detailing the working relationship between the Navy and the manufacturer in
the various stages of production on the submarine in which Navy divers met their deaths).
131 See id. at 1480 (setting forth the plaintiffs argument that, even though the specifica-
tions used in the manufacture and design were precise, the manufacturer should be unable
to invoke the government contractor defense because the manufacturer failed to obtain ac-
tual government approval of specifications for the design and manufacturer of the Navy
submarine in question).
132 See id. at 1479 (stating the district court's holding that the government employees'
stamp of approval was insufficient to give General Dynamics the ability to invoke the gov-
ernment contractor defense).
133 Id. at 1480 (reasoning that a mere perfunctory governmental approval of the product
design is insufficient to justify the sharing of governmental immunity with the contractor).
134 See id. (echoing the Boyle Court's concern for the protection of the government's dis-
cretionary function as a rationale for the government contractor defense).
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final design satisfy minimal or general standards established by
the government. 135
According to the Trevino court, the government does not exercise
discretion merely because it has "final approval" of the design or
because it "approved" the design without any substantive review.136
After Trevino, "approval" appears to turn on the level of substan-
tive participation between the contractor and the government, at
least in the Fifth Circuit. The more the government participates or
is perceived to participate in the design process, the more apparent
the government's discretionary function. Discovery techniques
aimed at uncovering the extent of the government's participation
enable the plaintiff to better prepare against the defendant contrac-
tor's possible invocation of the Boyle defense.
B. The Equipment Conforms to Specifications
Boyle's second element requires that the equipment conform to
specifications provided by the government. 13 7 This requirement mo-
tivates the contractor to ensure that any design-feature deviations
are brought to the government's attention.138 An attack on Boyle's
conformance prong entails defining the specifications involved. In
principle, conformance to specifications that are merely general in
nature does not constitute the type of pervasive involvement in the
design process that is the foundation of the government contractor
defense. If a contractor deviates from the government specifica-
tions, the government is no longer exercising its discretionary func-
tion. 39 Nevertheless, the second element of the Boyle defense pres-
ents a formidable obstacle for plaintiffs.
Generally, unless the plaintiff has shown that the product was
defectively manufactured, a contractor satisfies this second re-
135 Id.
138 Id. (holding that government approval necessitates more than a cursory endorsement
or determination that the design complies with general requirements, even when that ap-
proval may be considered final).
137 See id. at 1479 (discussing the second prong of the contractor defense as set forth in
Boyle).
138 See id. at 1481 (discussing the rationale for the second prong of the Boyle test which
requires conformance with government specifications).
139 In theory, the government contractor will have the government review any necessary
alterations to a design in order to ensure that the end product conforms to the government's
specifications. See Haizlip, supra note 71, at 140 (intimating that a contractor should have
the government review all of the specifications and warn of any risks to insure protection by
the Boyle defense); Seidelson, supra note 113, at 260-63 (noting the relationship between the
government contractor and the government following the Boyle decision).
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quirement when the government accepts the product in question. 140
Another scenario has also proved successful for the government
contractor. Often, the contractor will reduce the government-
approved designs to drawings for government review and approval.
If the contractor complies with the specifications in those drawings,
he has met Boyle's second prong.14'
In Kleemann v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,142 the Fourth Circuit
thoroughly analyzed the second prong of the Boyle defense and de-
termined "what conformity means."1 43 In Kleemann, a Navy pilot
died when his "aircraft went out of control during landing, left the
runway, and overturned." 144 The pilot's surviving spouse and chil-
dren sued the manufacturer, McDonnell Douglas. The plaintiffs
claimed that the landing gear did not conform to reasonably precise
specifications contained in the Navy's original contract with
McDonnell Douglas. 45 The court noted that
Plaintiffs' claim is precisely the sort for which the defense
was intended .... [The issue] is a discretionary decision in-
volving military hardware in which the government was a
substantial participant.... It is hard to imagine a matter
more uniquely in the province of the military-and one less
appropriate to second-guessing by civilian courts-than the
development of a high technology, multi-mission aircraft. 46
The Kleemann court found that, during the design development,
the Navy required McDonnell Douglas to submit detailed drawings
for approval and that changes to the aircraft's design or specifica-
tions required approval. 147 Further, the Kleemann court deter-
mined that because "the Navy was intimately involved at various
stages of the design ... process, the required government approval
of the alleged design defect is more likely to be made out. Simi-
140 See Haizlip, supra note 71, at 139 (discussing the means by which a contractor may
meet the second element of the Boyle defense).
141 See Butler v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 89 F.3d 582, 585 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming
summary judgment based on government contractor defense where contractor submitted
drawings based on Navy designs, the drawings were accepted by the Navy, and the product
was constructed in accordance with the drawings).
142 890 F.2d 698 (4th Cir. 1989).
143 Id. at 699.
144 Id. at 700 (recounting facts which led to the suit by Kleemann's spouse and children
seeking redress from aircraft manufacturer).
145 See id. (discussing plaintiffs allegations of a malfunction of the landing gear and that
the landing gear did not conform to reasonably precise specifications).
146 Id. at 700-01.
147 See id. at 701.
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larly, the Navy's extensive participation... enhances the likelihood
of final product conformity." 148 Thus, government participation "in
the various stages of' a product's development seems to be the
"salient fact" that establishes the military contractor defense. 149
Much of the evidence used in analyzing Boyle's first prong is also
relevant when analyzing the second prong. For example, in Land-
graf v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co.,150 the Sixth Circuit rec-
ognized that "[t]he ultimate question of whether the helicopter con-
formed to reasonably precise specifications depends on our
determination of what constituted the 'reasonably precise specifica-
tions."' 15 1 Thus, if the contractor successfully proves the first ele-
ment of the defense, the second element should not pose a great ob-
stacle to the contractor.
In Landgraf, McDonnell Douglas contracted with the Army to de-
sign OH-6A helicopters. 152 The design specifications precluded the
possibility that the helicopter's rotor blades would strike another
part of the aircraft by setting clearance minimums at "not ... less
than 9 inches, and preferably 12 inches." 53 Jerome Landgraf was
aboard an OH-6A helicopter when it lost power and began to de-
scend. 54 The main rotor lost speed, and one of the rotor blades
struck and severed the tail boom.15 5 "The helicopter then fell the fi-
nal 100 feet of its descent and crashed violently," killing everyone
aboard.156 Landgrafs wife brought suit against McDonnell Douglas,
seeking damages under state tort law. 157
The district court granted summary judgment for McDonnell
Douglas based on the government contractor defense. 58 On appeal,
the plaintiff conceded that McDonnell Douglas established Boyle's
first and third prongs, stating that the government's specifications
148 Id. (citations omitted).
149 Id.
150 993 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1993).
151 Id. at 559.
152 See id.
153 Id. at 561.
154 See id. at 559 (detailing the facts which led to death of Landgraf, the ensuing litiga-




158 See id. (explaining the district court's holding that since plaintiff failed to bring forth
"genuine issues of material fact" denying the application of the government contractor de-
fense to the case, "McDonnell Douglas was entitled to judgment as a matter of law").
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were not "general" or "qualitative," but were indeed precise. 159
However, the plaintiff argued that McDonnell Douglas failed to es-
tablish the second prong-that the helicopter conformed to the
specifications provided. 16 0 Specifically, the plaintiff contended that
it was impossible to design a helicopter meeting the clearance re-
quirements specified, and, as a result, McDonnell Douglas had two
options: "[it] could either have declined to build the OH-6A [with
the specified clearances,] or it could have sought a deviation from
this requirement."1 1
In response, McDonnell Douglas argued that the plaintiff failed
to meet her burden because there were issues of material fact re-
maining. 162 In support of this contention, McDonnell Douglas
pointed to an expert's affidavit submitted with its motion for sum-
mary judgment, the truth of the expert's assertion finding support
in "a number of undisputed facts." 63 First, the clearance specifica-
tions were established before the OH-6A helicopter was proposed,
and were, therefore, a "general and generic" set of standards appli-
cable to most types of helicopters. 164 Second, as the Army accepted
and approved each OH-6A, it compared the aircraft to the detailed
specifications, not the general clearance specifications. 165 Finally,
McDonnell Douglas contended that no designer could guarantee
that the rotor blades will not flap and strike other parts of the air-
craft when a helicopter experiences a midair power loss. 166 Al-
though the OH-6A clearance specifications contained a statement
repeating the Army's goal of obtaining helicopters that are safe
from rotor blade/tail boom contact, McDonnell Douglas claimed that
these statements were merely "precatory." 67
In its opinion, the Landgraf court determined that when the gov-
ernment issues military specifications and a reported deviation fol-
lows, government acceptance of the product despite the deviation is
159 Id. at 560-61 (conceding establishment of the first and third prongs); see supra text ac-
companying note 95 (presenting the three-prong test used by courts when contractors raise
the government contractor defense).
160 See Landgraf, 993 F.2d at 560.
161 Id. at 561 (discussing the virtual impossibility of the contractor meeting the govern-
ment's specifications, and options available to the contractor).
162 See id. (explaining the defendant's position that an expert's declaration that the
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strong evidence that the specifications were merely a desirable
goal.168 According to the Sixth Circuit, such knowledge and accep-
tance of a deviation establishes that the equipment has conformed
to specifications. 169 In upholding summary judgment for McDonnell
Douglas, the court relied on the years of continuous contact be-
tween McDonnell Douglas and the Army during the procurement,
testing, and production phases of the OH-6A.17 ° The court held:
By permitting production to continue without any change in
design..., the Army made a discretionary decision to not in-
sist on the clearance recommended .... [B]y acquiescing in
the continued production without change and acceptance
and certification of helicopters produced thereafter, the
Army treated [the clearance specifications on rotor-to-air-
frame contact] as a precatory statement.17'
Relying upon the facts presented, the court noted that the Army
did not believe rotor-to-airframe strikes could be completely elimi-
nated, but could only be reduced in probability. 172 Additionally, the
court recognized that, although the Army was informed that as lit-
tle as three inches of rotor-to-airframe clearance existed, the Army
ordered no further changes to the configuration. 73 According to the
Sixth Circuit, these facts were sufficient to establish Boyle's con-
formity element. 174
From Landgraf, it appears that a government contractor can es-
tablish the second prong of the Boyle defense by showing that the
contractor produced equipment conforming to design specifications
adopted or issued by a government agency which exercised discre-
tionary authority. 75 However, what constitutes "precise specifica-
tions" versus a "desirable goal" leaves ample room for disagree-
ment. The Sixth Circuit clearly stated that mere government
168 See id. at 564 (opining that when the government accepts a deviation, acceptance is
proof that the design was merely a means to a goal).
169 See id. (reasoning that acceptance of a product, which includes a deviation, is evidence
of conformity).
170 See id. at 563-64 (discussing the court's reasoning for upholding summary judgment).
171 Id. at 564.
172 See id. (limiting its decision to the facts of the case).
173 See id. (noting that the Army's specifications had called for nine to twelve inches of
clearance).
174 See id. ("Boyle makes clear that the government contractor defense is intended to pro-
tect military contractors from state tort liability when they produce equipment conforming to
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cooperation with the contractor in design and development does not
assure that the second prong of the Boyle defense will be satis-
fied. 176 Rather, when military specifications are promulgated and
the contractor gives notice of his inability to meet those standards,
the specifications will be-deemed a goal rather than a condition re-
quiring conformance. 177
C. Warnings to the Government
The third and final prong of the Boyle defense requires that the
supplier warn the government about dangers involving the equip-
ment known to the supplier but not known to the government. 178 If
the defendant contractor contends that there were no known dan-
gers, the plaintiff must establish three things to defeat this ele-
ment.179 The plaintiff must prove: first, that the contractor knew of
some danger resulting from the use of the product; second, that the
government was unaware of the danger; and third, that the con-
tractor failed to warn the government about the danger. 80 By
adopting this third prong, the Boyle Court clearly intended to alle-
viate the burden of proof placed on contractors to issue warnings to
the government.' 8'
178 See id. (noting, further, that even approval after testing the equipment does not neces-
sarily satisfy Boyle's second prong).
177 See id. (distinguishing among situations which will and will not satisfy the second
prong of the Boyle test).
178 See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (establishing the three-prong test
for the application of the government contractor defense), on remand, 857 F.2d 1468 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 994 (1988), and reh'g denied, 489 U.S. 1047 (1989).
179 See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 792 F.2d 413, 414 (4th Cir. 1986) (discussing what
the plaintiff must do in order to defeat a government contractor's claim that there were no
known dangers, therefore, no duty on the part of the contractor to make the dangers known
to the government), vacated, 487 U.S. 500, on remand, 857 F.2d 1468 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 994 (1988), reh'g denied, 489 U.S. 1047 (1989). The Supreme Court agreed with the
list of elements that the Fourth Circuit deemed necessary to invoke the government contrac-
tor defense. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512. The elements include: "(1) the United States ap-
proved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications;
and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment
that were known to the supplier but not to the United States." Id.
180 See id. at 513 (noting immunity of contractors from tort liability when they are con-
tracting with the government in the event that the contractor can meet a three-prong test);
see also Harry A. Austin, Comment, Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation: A Question-
able Expansion of the Government Contract Defense, 23 GA. L. REV. 227, 250-55 (1988)
(explaining how the requirements established by the Boyle decision changed the law in favor
of government contactors).
181 See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 513 ("[I]t does not seem to us sound policy to penalize, and thus
deter, active contractor participation in the designing process, placing the contractor at risk
unless it identifies all design defects.").
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In Trevino, the trial court found that the defendant failed to meet
the third element of the Boyle defense because the defendant failed
to warn the government of dangers about which it knew or should
have known. 8 2 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
trial court incorrectly applied the final element of the government
contractor defense, holding that a "contractor is only responsible for
warning the government of dangers about which it has actual
knowledge.' 8 3 The Fifth Circuit upheld the trial court's decision,
however, because the government had delegated the design discre-
tion to the contractor and "never approved reasonably precise speci-
fications within the meaning of Boyle." 8
4
In considering the warning element, a court must often re-
analyze issues visited under Boyle's first two prongs. 185 Govern-
ment acceptance of the product in question is evidence of the gov-
ernment's knowledge of any danger.186 Also, evidence of detailed
government involvement in the procurement and design process
helps to establish Boyle's third requirement. 8 7 Moreover, the
length of time the government uses the product may itself establish
the government's knowledge of a danger. 88
182 See Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1487 (5th Cir. 1989)
(discussing the district court's opinion).
183 See id. at 1487.
184 See id. at 1487-88 (upholding the decision of the trial court).
185 See supra text accompanying note 95.
186 However, it must be noted that "[i]f the government has ... delegated its discretion to
the contractor ... substantive review and evaluation of the contractor's design choices" is
necessary to invoke the defense-acceptance alone would not indicate knowledge in that sce-
nario. Trevino, 865 F.2d at 1486.
187 See id. at 1481-82.
The [Supreme] Court's inclusion of a warning element must indicate that approval re-
quires some level of evaluation and review; otherwise a government contractor might
argue one day that it should have the benefit of the defense despite its failure to give a
warning because the government had rubber-stamped the design, because the informa-
tion withheld would have been of no use to the government and was not desired by the
government, and because the provision of the information would not have affected the
government's 'approval' of the design. The Supreme Court noted that the warning re-
quirement prevents the defense from creating an incentive to withhold information. ...
That purpose would be a farce if the government could approve specifications without
evaluating them.
Id.
188 See generally Landgrafv. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 993 F.2d 558, 562-63 (6th
Cir. 1993) (describing the factual background to the Landgraf court's decision to reverse the
summary judgment granted on behalf of the defendant, particularly 'the development of the
OH-6A from 1966 to 1988" combined with the Army's "continued flight testing during produc-
tion... [which] involved hundreds of hours of flying and led to many design changes").
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The best method to attack Boyle's third element is for the plain-
tiff to establish intentional non-disclosure or negligence by the de-
fense contractor. During the discovery process, the plaintiff should
be alert for any memoranda or notes indicating that the contractor
knew of potential problems. Furthermore, if discovery reveals that
the contractor had such knowledge, the plaintiff should seek to de-
termine whether any correspondence or documentation exists pro-
viding the government with actual or constructive notice. Addi-
tionally, the plaintiff may uncover evidence that the contractor had
knowledge, but breached the duty of notice through bureaucratic
mismanagement or incompetence. This situation may arise When
the contractor finds a defect or deficiency in the product, but pro-
vides improper or inadequate notice, fails to give notice altogether,
or destroys any relevant documentation. Examples of these situa-
tions are improper changes to an aircraft technical manual, or the
government's complete failure to receive the correct change to the
equipment. Proving that the contractor knew of a defect or an un-
reasonably dangerous aspect of the product is a difficult task.
However, the plaintiff may accomplish this purpose through intense
and proper discovery.
IV. ANOTHER POSSIBLE HURDLE: OFFSET AND THE COLLATERAL
SOURCE RULE
Assuming that a plaintiff has overcome the Boyle defense, an-
other potential barrier to recovery against a government contractor
is a retreat from the collateral source rule. "The collateral source
rule is both a rule of evidence and a rule of damages." 8 9 As a rule
of evidence, the collateral source rule precludes the introduction of
any benefits the plaintiff may have received from someone other
than the defendant. 90 As a rule of damages, it requires that the de-
fendant pay the entire amount of damages notwithstanding the
collateral source of recovery received by the plaintiff.191 This issue
189 James L. Branton, The Collateral Source Rule, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 883, 883 (1987); see
Julie A. Schafer, Note, The Constitutionality of Offsetting Collateral Benefits Under Ohio Re-
vised Code Section 2317.45, 53 OHIO ST. L. J., 587, 589 (1992).
190 See Branton, supra note 189, at 883; see also Schafer, supra note 189, at 589 (noting
the effect that the collateral source rule has on the recovery of damages and the difficulty
this rule poses when the collateral source is unattainable directly, whether it be by immunity
or otherwise).
191 See Branton, supra note 189, at 883 (discussing the effects of the collateral source rule
on potential recovery for the plaintiff in a civil liability suit).
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often arises when an insurance or employment benefit has been
paid after the injury to the plaintiff or his estate.192
Fueled by the insurance industry "crisis" and the recent pendu-
lum swing toward tort reform, the collateral source rule has come
under intense criticism.193 At the extreme, some commentators
have suggested that the rule be totally abolished. 194 However, most
courts have been reluctant to do so, and those jurisdictions that
have abolished it have done so by statute.195 Nevertheless, defense
counsel might contend that a judgment for damages in addition to
other benefits constitutes a double recovery, and that the plaintiff
should not be "made whole" a second time.196
The collateral source rule's greatest weakness is that it tends to
place the plaintiff in a better position than he was in before the ac-
cident occurred. 197 As one critic has stated:
The collateral source rule has evolved from opposing princi-
ples of tort law. First, the rule conflicts with the compensa-
tory function of tort law. Full compensation is provided
when the plaintiff is restored to the position he or she occu-
pied before the tort occurred. If a plaintiff receives compen-
sation from a third party... , receipt of these benefits
should in theory be used to reduce the tortfeasor's total
damages. However, the collateral source rule requires the
tortfeasor to pay the judgment even though the plaintiff has
already been partly or completely compensated for the inju-
ries suffered. 198
Another complaint about the collateral source rule is that it en-
courages, and even motivates, the plaintiff to litigate. 99 After a
192 See Linda J. Gobis, Note, Lambert v. Wrensch: Another Step Toward Abrogation of the
Collateral Source Rule in Wisconsin, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 857, 861 (noting that the collateral
source rule in Wisconsin applies to plaintiffs recovery via insurance policies, employment
benefits, gratuities, and legislated social benefits).
193 See Branton, supra note 189, at 887 (commenting on the modern criticism of the col-
lateral source rule).
194 See Shafer, supra note 189 at 588 (noting that state legislatures adopted tort reform in
response to scholarship advocating that the collateral source rule should be eliminated).
195 See Branton, supra note 189, at 887-88 (discussing abolition of the collateral source
rule by statute in some jurisdictions); see also Schafer, supra note 189, at 588 (noting Ohio's
statute which abolishes the rule).
196 Branton, supra note 189, at 885.
197 See Gobis, supra note 192, at 860 (noting that double recovery is possible).
198 Id. (footnotes omitted).
199 See Daena A. Goldsmith, A Survey of the Collateral Source Rule: The Effects of Tort
Reform and Impact on Multistate Litigation, 53 J. AIR L. & COM. 799, 803 (1988) ("[T]he col-
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service member's" death, his estate receives compensation in both
cash and benefits through the Veterans Benefits Act.200 Any ensu-
ing litigation against a government defense contractor will generate
attorneys' fees and consume the time of litigants, jurors, and wit-
nesses.
201
The standard reformist would probably argue that, at a mini-
mum, collateral sources should be allowed in as evidence so the
trier of fact has the opportunity to offset the collateral source to the
damages awarded. 20 2 In jurisdictions where the collateral source
rule has remained untouched by legislation, at least one court has
admitted evidence of collateral sources into trial. In Dietz v.
Becker,203 the Georgia Court of Appeals ruled that admitting evi-
dence concerning plaintiffs receipt of disability payments was not
"inadmissible collateral source evidence, but rather was admissible
to impeach Dietz's statement concerning financial worries."20 4
Thus, so far, the collateral source rule continues to protect the
plaintiffs recovery.
The plaintiffs best response to critics of the collateral source rule
is that the defendant must be held responsible for his actions, and
that any type of reduction in liability rewards the tortfeasor. 205
Thus, if the court must choose between two perceived evils-
allowing an injured party to obtain a double recovery or allowing a
culpable defendant a windfall from a collateral source-then the
better choice would be to punish the culpable defendant.20 6 Moreo-
ver, one could argue that an injured party can never be made
lateral source rule encourages a plaintiff to litigate rather than to accept what he already
received as payment.").
200 See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131 (1994) (granting basic entitlement of benefits to surviving
family members).
201 See Goldsmith, supra note 199, at 803 (noting, also, the waste of judicial resources).
202 See Christopher J. Eaton, Comment, The Kansas Legislature's Attempt to Abrogate the
Collateral Source Rule: Three Strikes and They're Out?, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 913, 921 (1994)
(giving arguments for and against the rule); see also Banks McDowell, The Collateral Source
Rule-The American Medical Association and Tort Reform, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 205, 213-15
(1985) (explaining how introduction of collateral source evidence could benefit plaintiffs).
203 434 S.E.2d 103 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
204 Id. at 105 (allowing evidence of a collateral source in rebuttal of plaintiffs contention
of financial pressure).
205 See Goldsmith, supra note 199, at 800-01 (explaining the justification for the existence
of the collateral source rule).
206 See id. (arguing that it is better to fully punish the tortfeasor even if to do so means
that the plaintiff is made more than whole).
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whole.207 As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia stated in Hudson v. Lazarus:208
[T]he law seeks to award compensation, and no more.....
Legal 'compensation'. . . does not actually compensate. Not
many people would sell an arm for the average or even the
maximum amount that juries award for loss of an arm.
Moreover the injured person seldom gets the compensation
he 'recovers', for a substantial attorney's fee usually comes
out of it."209
The court further reasoned that a limit exists as to what a tortfea-
sor must pay, but it should not be reduced by the injured person's
recovery of money or benefits from a collateral source. 210
CONCLUSION
In an attempt to defeat the government contractor defense, the
plaintiff will likely focus his energy on proving that the contractor
did not meet Boyle's first element-that the government approved
reasonably precise specifications. 211 If the surrounding facts per-
mit, the plaintiffs best option is to show that the government's ap-
proval involved little substantive review and was merely a "rubber
stamp." The discovery process will quickly show whether the gov-
ernment was intimately involved in the design process of the prod-
uct in question. If the government's involvement was minimal, the
plaintiff has a strong weapon with which to resist the Boyle de-
fense. However, because most of the evidence used in analyzing
Boyle's first element is relevant to the second and third elements, a
plaintiff who cannot disprove the first prong will have difficulties
defeating the contractor through the second or third prongs of the
test.
The second element of the government contractor defense re-
quires that the product conform to the aforementioned reasonably
precise specifications. 212 If the government accepts and uses the
equipment, courts generally find that the second element of the
207 See Branton, supra note 189, at 885 (proffering that money damages are "inadequate
at best").
208 217 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
209 Id. at 346.
210 See id. (noting the determination of a negligent wrongdoer's liability should fairly bal-
ance individual and social interests).
211 See supra notes 106-36 and accompanying text.
212 See supra notes 137-77 and accompanying text.
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Boyle defense is met.213 The best line of attack for the plaintiff may
be to show that the product in question deviated from the specifica-
tions and that the specifications were not a "desired goal" for the
product, but were instructions for strict compliance.
The final prong, the "warning" element, requires that the con-
tractor warn the government of any inherent dangers of which the
contractor has actual knowledge. 214 The "actual knowledge" re-
quirement is a low standard that is easily met by the defendant.
The plaintiffs only feasible avenue is to prove that the contractor
intentionally withheld information of a risk from the government.
The Boyle case stands as one of the twentieth century's most bla-
tant examples of judicial activism. With its opinion, the Supreme
Court created a defense which the elected legislators of the country
had conscientiously refused to recognize.215 It is the law, however,
and as such must be overcome for an injured party to recover from
a government contractor. Although the Boyle defense places diffi-
cult hurdles before a plaintiff, overcoming these hurdles is not an
impossible burden. If a plaintiff seeking to recover damages from
the contractor in a products liability action can prove he has over-
come the elements of the defense, the plaintiff may proceed to trial.
This is, however, more easily written than achieved.
213 See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text (discussing the Landgraf decision).
214 See supra notes 178-88 and accompanying text.
215 See, e.g., H.R. 4765, 99th Cong. (1986) (debating the civil liability of government con-
tractors); S. 2441, 99th Cong. (1986) (proposing limitations regarding liability for those who
contract with the government); see also H.R. 2378, 100th Cong. (1987) (attempting to provide
indemnification of government contractors from civil liability); H.R. 5883, 98th Cong. (1984)
(proposing to allow an equitable reduction of liability for government contractors).
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Despite legislative efforts to define it, the concept of Fair Use' has
been the subject of aggressive debate among publishers, authors,
librarians, and users of copyrighted information ("academics") at
academic institutions. 2 With the advent of the Internet and the
prospect of multimedia projects,3 the debate has intensified and ex-
panded into the international community.4
* Recently ending tenure as Senior Associate Counsel for Research and Adjunct Professor,
University of Iowa and University of Iowa College of Law. Visiting Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Tulsa College of Law, Spring 1999. A.B., Brown University; J.D., Boalt Hall School
of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
** Associate, Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, P.L.C. B.S., Southern University at New
Orleans; M.A., University of Northern Iowa; Ph.D., University of Iowa; J.D., Washington &
Lee University School of Law. Law Clerk, Honorable Fred Banks, Mississippi Supreme
Court. The authors wish to thank Professor Lelia B. Helms, Professor Kenneth D. Crews,
and Leigh Rigby-Adcock for their assistance and support in reading and reviewing the origi-
nal manuscript for this Article, and for providing invaluable insight and comment. In addi-
tion, the authors are grateful to the law firm of Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, P.L.C. for
its support in this endeavor. Finally, thanks go to Jamie Henby for her assistance.
1 Fair Use has been defined as "'the privilege in others than the owner to use the copy-
righted material in a reasonable manner without ... consent, notwithstanding the monopoly
granted to the owner.'" HARRY G. HENN, COPYRIGHT LAw: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 179 (2d
ed. 1988) (quoting Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir.
1966)).
2 See Benjamin Ely Marks, Note, Copyright Protection, Privacy Rights, and the Fair Use
Doctrine: The Post-Salinger Decade Reconsidered, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1376, 1376, 1389 (1997)
(noting that decisions in several cases limiting the applicability of fair use generated criti-
cism and activity among these groups).
3 "Multimedia projects" refer to projects involving the use of multiple sources of copy-
righted material including, but not limited to, film, video, magazines, and newspapers. See
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 5 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 21, at 61-62 (1998)
(noting that a multimedia work "combines authorship in two or more media").
4 The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) held its Diplomatic Conference on
Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions in Geneva, Switzerland, in December
1996. See Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions
(visited Nov. 20, 1998) <http://www.wipo.org/eng/diplconf/4dc-star.htm>. The primary
